Proportional Representation (PR) Demand Premature for US

Vote casting. Photo collected.

In a political landscape already burdened by volatility and mistrust, the recent movement by five Islamic parties demanding elections under a proportional representation (PR) system introduces a new—and deeply contentious—dimension to Bangladesh’s electoral discourse. This demand, notably absent from the decisions of the National Consensus Commission (NCC), threatens to fracture the fragile consensus painstakingly built around electoral reform.

The Constitution of Bangladesh, through Article 65(2), mandates direct elections from single territorial constituencies. The PR system, which allocates seats based on the percentage of votes a party receives nationwide, has no legal or historical precedent in our parliamentary practice. While the NCC did agree to PR-based representation in the proposed upper house, extending this principle to the lower house was never tabled, let alone agreed upon. The current agitation thus represents a unilateral deviation from the consensus framework—one that risks undermining the very spirit of collaborative reform.

The timing and tenor of the demand raise critical questions. Four of the five parties spearheading this movement have never held seats in Parliament. The fifth—Jamaat-e-Islami—last saw electoral success in 2001. Their inability to field viable candidates across 300 constituencies appears to be the underlying reason behind the PR push. By banking on aggregate vote share rather than constituency-level credibility, these parties seek legislative representation without the rigor of grassroots engagement. This is not reform—it is circumvention.

What makes this movement more provocative is its overt targeting of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the largest opposition force. The PR demand is being framed not merely as a structural reform but as a political counterweight to BNP’s electoral dominance. This adversarial posture risks polarizing the reform discourse and turning a technical debate into a partisan battleground. As BNP leaders have rightly pointed out, the sudden insistence on PR—without public familiarity or institutional readiness—could mislead voters and destabilize democratic norms.

If parties begin to press for reforms outside the consensus framework, the entire architecture of electoral reform could unravel. The NCC was envisioned as a platform for convergence, not divergence. Introducing demands post facto—especially those with no constitutional basis—sets a dangerous precedent. It invites others to reopen settled debates, thereby jeopardizing reforms already agreed upon.

One of the parties advocating PR has stated that they wish to “test the efficacy” of the system at least for once. This admission betrays uncertainty. Bangladesh’s political future cannot hinge on experiments. Electoral systems are not laboratory instruments—they are foundational to democratic stability. To gamble with such a system without public education, legal clarity, or institutional safeguards is to invite chaos.

Bangladesh stands at a critical juncture. The post-Awami League era offers a rare opportunity to rebuild democratic institutions. But this rebuilding must be principled, inclusive, and coherent. The PR movement, in its current form, is neither. It is a shortcut dressed as reform, a disruption masquerading as innovation. If we are to move forward, we must reaffirm the sanctity of consensus and resist the allure of political expediency.