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Developing countries oppose bid to limit Just Transition Mechanism

Climate 2026-11-19, 6:25pm




Antalya, Nov 19 (Hilary Kung) – Developing countries in a united force under the G77 and China said strongly that they “will not accept a Just Transition Mechanism (JTM) that is simply a Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) 2.0 or an enhanced work programme.”

Egypt for the G77 and China insisted that “we want a mechanism that will deliver and work in complementarity (with the JTWP).” These remarks were made during the last contact group of the JTWP held in Antalya on Wed 18 Nov.

It called for engagement on the G77 and China’s “full-fledged proposal that directly responds to our mandate under decision 2/CMA.7”.

The governance arrangements of JTM and what institutional links, if any, it should have with the JTWP, remains a central flashpoint in the negotiations. The G77 and China, supported by all its sub-groups, strongly pushed back against the proposals from developed countries that would curtail the mechanism’s full potential.

Developed countries aligned around integrating the JTWP into the JTM and opposed new governance structures. Calling a constituted body a “red line,” the European Union (EU) pushed to integrate the JTWP into the JTM, a move backed by the United Kingdom (UK), Norway, Canada, and New Zealand to maintain a single, coherent track and avoid duplication or “complex architecture.” Meanwhile, Japan opposed creating a steering committee or new financial arrangements, citing budgetary constraints.

The last contact group, Co-chaired by Federica Fricano (Italy) and Joseph Teo (Singapore), convened at 8 pm on Nov 18, to hear a report back from Parties on their informal-informal (inf-inf) discussions (without the Co-facilitators or observers) held to resolve divergences. Chile, which co-facilitated the inf-inf alongside Canada, noted that “persistent divergences” prevented a consensus and indicated that “further ministerial consultations are needed to help Parties reach a decision.”

Parties then mandated the Co-chairs to produce a revised iteration of the text. With the Antalya talks set to conclude on Friday, Nov 20, the new draft is expected on Thursday, morning, Nov 19. The Co-chairs noted they will report back to the COP 31 Presidencies, saying that while the new iteration is under their own responsibility, the “new text would still require a lot of work” and the Presidency would take the work forward.

The first week of negotiations under the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) concluded with Parties agreeing to forward the informal note for further consideration during the final week under the CMA 8, recognizing that the text “carries no formal status, reflects divergent views rather than consensus, is non-exhaustive, remains open to revision, and neither captures all submissions nor prejudges future work.” The Co-chairs released the first iteration of an informal note on Nov 13 after hearing Parties’ views on the operationalisation of the JTM, review of the JTWP, and key messages from the 5th and 6th JTWP dialogues.

Technical negotiations continued from Nov 16 and extended to Nov 18, running alongside the high-level ministerial roundtable on just transition on Nov 16 and ministerial consultations held on Nov 17 to address outstanding political issues regarding the JTM, specifically on its “political and implementation arms,” the timeframe for operationalizing the JTM, and its relationship with the JTWP.

Below are some key highlights on the interventions on JTM governance.

Egypt for the G77 and China noted that the group had already submitted its views and highlighted flexibility regarding a phased approach to operationalising the JTM. Warning against rushing operationalization under modalities proposed by developed countries that could fall short of delivering the full potential of JTM, Egypt stated: “We have to come to the reality [that] we might not necessarily finish everything at this session.”

Elaborating further on its expectation of the new iteration of the text, Egypt said, “We must agree on an institutional structure that is instrumental in housing the functions. Agreeing on the functions [without a home for them] will not be helpful [to] deliver a functional mechanism. So, we really want to see all of these positions reflected in the next iteration clearly, even if they appear in the margins as G77 and China’s options.” This call was strongly echoed by developing country sub groups, including the African Group, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), Land-locked Developing countries (LLDC), Least Developed Countries (LMDC), the Arab Group, the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC), Brazil, Burkina Faso, Philippines, and Panama.

In its earlier intervention providing an overarching comment on the draft text, the G77 and China emphasized that international cooperation is essential for achieving just transitions and must be reflected as a cross-cutting principle throughout the entire text. The Group emphasized that it has “consistently approached just transitions from the standpoint of fairness and equity, at the national level and, above all, at the international level”. [See TWN Update 5 for more details on developing nations back two-tier just transition mechanism structure.]

The Group then expressed deep concerns that the text mentions international cooperation only twice: once, in the preamble and once among more than 40 dialogue key messages. Egypt noted that this omission is particularly troubling given last year’s agreement that the core purpose of the JTM is “to enhance international cooperation, technical assistance, capacity-building and knowledge sharing, and to enable equitable, inclusive just transitions”. This was also echoed by other sub groups.

Ghana for the African Group noted that while the draft text contains an option of establishing a steering committee, it omits details on its membership, selection process, rules of procedure, and a timeline for operationalising the JTM. To address this, it proposed nominating committee members by the 2027 June intersessional (66th session of the Subsidiary Bodies) (SB66), holding the committee’s first meeting prior to CMA9 and adopting its first workplan at CMA9 in Nov 2027. Ghana also reiterated that the JTWP cannot be subjected to a sunset clause before fulfilling its mandate, pointing out that the 7th dialogue on international cooperation is still pending, and suggested that the work programme cannot be given an ‘obituary’ while its work remains unfinished. It also asked for the finance and the link to the high-level ministerial roundtable to be put back into the new iteration of the text.

Earlier, it had reiterated its support for a two-tier governance structure and proposed several targeted amendments, including tabling a JT finance framework to strengthen the proposed functions and modalities of the JTM to enhance international cooperation and enable countries to pursue equitable and inclusive just transitions. Ghana stated that the proposed JT finance framework aligns with Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement (PA), which mandates developed countries to provide climate finance to developing nations, while emphasizing the need for public, grant-based, and highly concessional funding.

Ghana also rebutted concerns by developed countries on the proposal for a constituted body. First, it said that it heard some concerns from developed countries that having a constituted body in the policy or political tier may duplicate para 21 of the draft text which refers to the implementation-support tier. It said that “it will not duplicate as you need support”, clarifying that para 21 concerns the supporting unit while para 20 relates to Parties who will be the steering committee.

(Para 20 in the text states that, “Further decides that the mechanism shall comprise two [tiers][dimensions]: a Party-driven policy [tier][dimension], in the form of a [joint contact group][steering committee with equitable geographical representation], and an implementation-oriented [tier][dimension] with meaningful engagement of non-Party stakeholder in both [tiers][dimensions] as appropriate [including through inclusive implementation-focused groups]. Para 21 refers to the three different options of how the implementation-oriented tier of the JTM should operate, whether with the support of UNFCCC secretariat only, a host or through existing constituted bodies, expert groups and work programmes)

Explaining further, it cited examples like the Paris Committee on Capacity Building (PCCB), the Technology Executive Committee (TEC), the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM) and the Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures (KCI), commenting that “a mechanism without anyone to steer is a web page”.

Second, on the concerns by developed countries of the extra cost incurred with setting up a new constituted body, the Group said that a new constituted body requires no new funds, citing the example of the that KCI which has run for years with minimal cost.

Third, regarding the developed countries’ proposal for the JTM to focus on mainstreaming across existing bodies, the Group said it agreed that “existing bodies must carry out the work [but the issue is over] fragmentation, adding that the proposed constituted body would “make the mainstreaming accountable to the CMA.”