What to expect at Climate Talks in Antalya

COP31, Turkiye, Antalia official logo

Antalya, 8 Nov (Radhika Chatterjee and Meena Raman) – The annual UN climate talks are taking place Antalya, Türkiye, from 9 to 20 Nov 2026, with Türkiye as the host of the conference, while Australia serves as the President of Negotiations.

The following bodies will convene:

1. The 31st session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 31);

2. The 8th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 8);

3. The 21st session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 21);

4. The 65th session of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI 65) and

5. The 65th session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA 65).

A WORLD IN CRISIS

The Antalya conference convenes at a time of profound global turmoil. 2026 has been marked by widespread human suffering and economic disruption, primarily arising from the illegal wars waged by the United States and Israel in the Middle East. The resulting energy and food crises have fuelled inflationary pressures, triggering widespread protests over rising living costs across the globe.

For many developing countries, the crisis has forced governments to divert scarce public resources away from essential social services and development priorities towards securing alternative energy supplies. These developments have exposed the complexity of transitioning away from fossil fuels. While the transition remains imperative, it cannot succeed unless it is undertaken in a manner that is just, orderly and equitable, ensuring that its costs do not fall disproportionately on the poor and vulnerable. This requires much more scaled up climate finance beyond what is currently on the table.

CLIMATE IMPACTS DEEPEN

At the same time, climate impacts continue to intensify. October witnessed devastating floods in Nepal and China linked to accelerated glacial melt, claiming thousands of lives and causing widespread destruction. The disaster highlighted the growing fragility of mountain ecosystems and underscored the escalating risks posed by rising global temperatures. These events have reinforced the urgency of strengthening international efforts to address loss and damage associated with climate change.

PROGRESS MADE, BUT NOT ENOUGH

Against this backdrop, the latest synthesis report (by the UNFCCC Secretariat) on nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement (PA) paints a mixed picture. It states that while implementation of the PA has delivered important progress in integrating climate considerations into policymaking, collective efforts to reduce emissions remain significantly off track from the reductions required by science to keep the 1.5°C temperature goal within reach and limit any temperature overshoot in both scale and duration. The report also highlights growing recognition that climate change extends beyond mitigation and that as global temperatures continue to rise, adaptation and resilience building are becoming central components of national climate strategies, along efforts to loss and damage.

Central to the debate on the persistent mitigation gap will be the question of responsibility, with many developing countries expected to argue that developed countries have failed to undertake their fair share of emissions reductions, despite having already overconsumed the carbon space available for achieving the temperature limits. Repeated proclamations by developed countries on the urgency to limit temperature rise to 1.5°C, often obscure the reality of their grossly inadequate action, whose emissions reductions and financial support remain far short of what is required to meet the goals of the PA.

The implementation challenge

Governments will once again face the challenge of translating climate commitments into tangible action while navigating persistent disagreements over equity, finance and national development priorities.

For developing countries, the provision of the means of implementation for climate action remains central, as consistently argued by the Group of 77 and China. The credibility of outcomes at COP 31 will ultimately be judged by whether developed countries deliver finance, technology transfer and capacity-building support at the scale, quality and accessibility required by developing nations.

The push for roadmaps to transition away from fossil fuels or other mitigation targets such as that on electrification (with the latter advanced by the Turkish Presidency), can be expected to be met with resistance by many developing countries on how this is to be achieved without the commensurate scale of resources needed by developing countries on the means to implementation.

As delegates gather in Antalya, a central question will be whether political leaders can bridge long-standing divides and move from promises to implementation in a world confronting intertwined climate, energy, economic and geopolitical crises.

The following are highlights of some of the key issues in Antalya.

AGENDA FIGHTS

The climate finance work programme (cfwp) – a major battleground

A major item on the provisional agenda of CMA 8, and one that is expected to generate significant controversy, is the “Work programme on climate finance, including on Article 9.1 of the PA in the context of Article 9 as a whole”, commonly referred to as the Climate Finance Work Programme (CFWP).

The CFWP was established through para 54 of the “Global Mutirão” decision adopted in Belém, which decided “to establish a two-year work programme on climate finance, including on Article 9.1 … in the context of Article 9 … as a whole”, accompanied by a footnote stating that this was “without prejudging the process on the implementation of the new collective quantified goal” (NCQG).

For developing countries, the CFWP is a critical process because it provides a dedicated space to address implementation of Article 9.1 of the PA, which obliges developed countries to provide financial resources to assist developing countries in mitigating and adapting to climate change.

However, discussions at SB 64 revealed sharp disagreements over the work programme’s scope and modalities. Prior to the session, the co-chairs released a work plan for 2026-2027. The G77 and China strongly objected to using the co-chairs’ work plan as the basis for the programme’s work, arguing that Parties had yet to agree on the scope and modalities of the CFWP.

The Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) and the Arab Group further insisted that the CFWP be placed on the agenda of CMA 8. This position was subsequently backed by the G77 and China, which formally wrote to the COP 30 Presidency requesting the inclusion of the item.

Developed countries, including the European Union (EU), Switzerland, Canada, Norway, New Zealand, Japan and the United Kingdom (UK), took the opposite view. They argued that the Belém decision had already defined the scope of the work programme and that its implementation had effectively begun, making any further negotiations on scope and modalities unnecessary.

For developing countries, the stakes are high. Many have underscored that the CFWP has become even more important amid growing concerns over the adequacy and predictability of climate finance. Resources available through the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, including the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD), remain insufficient relative to needs, while prospects for ambitious replenishments appear uncertain.

These concerns have been amplified by recent announcements of reductions in climate finance by several developed countries, including the UK, Canada and Germany. The situation has been further compounded by the withdrawal of the US from both the UNFCCC and the PA, raising additional questions about the future availability of international climate finance.

The CFWP has now been included in the provisional agenda of CMA 8. Nevertheless, according to sources, some developed countries remain opposed to its inclusion. As a result, negotiations over the adoption of the CMA agenda itself could become an early battleground in Antalya, with the CFWP emerging as one of the first major political flashpoints of the conference.

Other new agenda proposals

Parties will also have to grapple with several new agenda proposals seeking inclusion under the COP, CMA and subsidiary bodies (SBs).

These include:

• A CMA 8 agenda item on “Tripling adaptation finance: implementation of para 53 of decision 1/CMA.7”, proposed by the African Group;

• A COP 31 agenda item on “Determination and periodic review of funding necessary and available for the Green Climate Fund”, also proposed by the African Group;

• A joint SBI 65, SBSTA 65 and CMA 8 agenda item on a “Trade and Climate Change Dialogue”, proposed by the African Group;

• A COP 31 agenda item on “Institutionalization of the dialogue on mountains and climate change as a standing annual item on the agenda of the subsidiary bodies, with outcomes reported to the COP”, proposed by Kyrgyzstan on behalf of the Mountain Group;

• A COP 31 agenda item on “1.5°C warming in Mountains”, proposed by Nepal and Bhutan.

As expected, these proposals are likely to prove contentious. Whether compromises on these agenda items will be negotiated behind closed doors before the opening of the conference, or whether they spill into opening plenaries and trigger procedural confrontations, remains to be seen.

MITIGATION WORK PROGRAMME (MWP) – DEBATE OVER ITS FUTURE

The MWP was established in 2021 under decision 1/CMA.3, with its modalities subsequently agreed through decision 4/CMA.4 in 2022. Under that mandate, the programme was scheduled to run until CMA 8 in 2026, with Parties also mandated to decide at CMA 8 whether and how the programme should continue beyond its initial term.

The discussions on the MWP’s future will be informed by para 16 of decision 13/CMA.7, which states that consideration of the programme’s continuation “shall be operationalized through focused exchanges of views, information and ideas” and that its outcomes should remain “non-prescriptive, non-punitive, facilitative, respectful of national sovereignty and national circumstances, take into account the nationally determined nature of nationally determined contributions and not impose new targets or goals.”

At SB 64, Parties exchanged views on the effectiveness of the MWP and how it should evolve after 2026. The central point of disagreement was not whether the programme should continue, but rather the principles that should govern any future mandate.

Many developing countries, including the LMDC, the African Group, the Arab Group, China, South Africa, and India, argued that any continuation of the MWP must retain the safeguards embedded in its current mandate, particularly those relating to national sovereignty and the nationally determined nature of climate action. They stressed that these safeguards had already been reaffirmed by Parties in paragraph 16 of decision 13/CMA.7 and should therefore form the basis of any future discussions.

By contrast, the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC) and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), with support from the EU, argued that deliberations on the future of the MWP should instead be guided primarily by para 1 of decision 4/CMA.4, which establishes the programme’s objective as urgently scaling up mitigation ambition and implementation during this critical decade in a manner that complements the global stocktake (GST) process.

At the heart of this debate lie longstanding differences over equity, historical responsibility and the nature of mitigation obligations under the PA. Many developing countries are concerned that an expanded or strengthened MWP could become a vehicle for increasing pressure on developing countries to adopt additional mitigation actions or targets, including measures linked to para 28 of the first GST outcome, such as “transitioning away from fossil fuels”, without corresponding commitments by developed countries to provide the finance, technology transfer and capacity-building support required for implementation.

For these countries, the discussion is also closely tied to the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC). They maintain that developed countries, given their historical responsibility for emissions and greater capabilities, must continue to take the lead in both raising mitigation ambition and implementing mitigation measures.

Adding another dimension to the debate are emerging proposals from some developed countries to establish new institutional arrangements on mitigation under the UNFCCC process. During the pre-COP consultations convened by the COP 31 Presidency in Fiji and Tuvalu, some developed countries reportedly floated the idea of creating a ‘Standing Committee on Mitigation’. Similarly, in its submission ahead of SB 64, the EU suggested exploring options such as a ‘Mitigation Advisory Committee’ or a ‘Facilitative Mitigation Action Mechanism.’

These proposals are likely to attract close scrutiny from developing countries. Many are wary that new mitigation-focused institutions could effectively transform the MWP into a mechanism for ratcheting up mitigation expectations on developing countries, while longstanding concerns over the provision of means of implementation by developed countries remain inadequately addressed.

Negotiations on the future of the MWP are expected to become a key political battleground, reflecting broader tensions over equity, historical responsibility and balance in the implementation of the PA.

FUTHER GUIDANCE ON FEATURES OF NDCs

At CMA 1, Parties agreed that the features of NDCs are already reflected in relevant provisions of the PA and decided that further guidance on NDC features would be considered at CMA 6. Discussions took place in 2024 Baku at CMA 6, but Parties were unable to reach agreement and decided to continue deliberations at CMA 8.

At CMA 6, when this matter was under consideration, developing countries like the LMDC, the African Group, Arab Group, Group SUR, India and Egypt said that NDC features were provided for in the PA, and the nationally determined nature of NDCs was crucial. In terms of new features for NDCs, they wanted to consider: guidance for adaptation, finance, technology transfer, capacity building, and impact of developed countries’ response measures on developing countries. They also stressed the need for maintaining differentiation between developed and developing country NDCs.

Developed countries like the US (who was still a party in the PA then), the EU, UK, Switzerland, Australia, Canada, Japan and some developing countries like the AOSIS, wanted to consider new features for NDCs such as: quantifiable targets; economy wide absolute emission reduction targets for all countries; following up of the GST outcomes which relate to mitigation efforts; aligning NDCs and long term low greenhouse gas (GHG) emission development strategies (LT-LEDS) with the 1.5°C goal; and clear base lines for emissions and peaking years..

Given the great divergences, it remains to be seen how discussions on this item will pan out.

ADAPTATION

Antalya will have the following adaptation items: Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), report of the Adaptation Committee, review of the progress, effectiveness and performance of the Adaptation Committee, National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), and guidance related to Adaptation Communications. Of the various adaptation items, advancing the Belem decision on the GGA is the most significant.

[At COP 30 in Belém via decision 12/CMA.7, Parties had adopted the Belém Adaptation Indicators (BAI), a list of 59 indicators developed by technical experts. Parties also established the Belém-Addis Vision (BAV), which comprises a two-year policy alignment process aimed at developing guidance for operationalising the indicators, together with technical work on improving metadata and methodologies for operationalising the BAI under the BAV. The BAI are built on the targets outlined in the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience (UAE FCGR), adopted at COP28 via decision 2/CMA.5. The UAE FCGR’s purpose is to guide the achievement of the GGA and the review of overall progress in achieving it, and provides that the work of the GGA would be aimed at achieving the targets by 2030 and progressively beyond.]

At SB 64 however, Parties were unable to advance the work on the technical task force intended to undertake technical work. This was due to the final draft text leaning heavily in favour of developed countries, in that it removed the involvement of Parties in the work of the technical task force. It also removed language on the principles of equity and CBDR-RC and watered down the language on adaptation finance, all of which are central to the negotiating positions of developing countries. Parties will now have to start afresh in Antalya.

Decision 12/CMA.7 also provided that the SBs will develop and agree in 2026–2027 the terms of reference for the review of the UAE FCGR, which Parties are also expected to undertake in Antalya.

On the NAPs, Parties in Belem via decision 8/CP.30 concluded the progress in the process to formulate and implement NAPs, and requested the Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG) to compile an overview of climate finance flows and financial support provided by developed countries to developing countries for formulating and implementing NAPs. At SB 65, Parties are expected to consider this, together with overall consideration of NAPs, taking into account the 2026 report on progress in the process to formulate and implement NAP. This report notes that as at 20 October 2026, 81 developing countries had submitted their NAPs, including 29 Least developed countries (LDCs) and 17 Small Island Developing States (SIDS).

JUST TRANSITION WORK PROGRAMME (JTWP)

Progress on the JTWP at SB 64 has laid the ground for further advances in Antalya. While the primary focus will be on operationalising the Just Transition Mechanism (JTM) following the historic decision in Belem, Parties also need to review the JTWP, decide its future, and also deliver the key messages from the 5th and 6th JTWP dialogues.

At SB 64, Parties agreed on the terms of reference (TOR) for the review of the JTWP and also initiated discussions on the operationalization of the JTM. They also took note of an informal note that was prepared by the co-chairs’ on their own responsibility (with the understanding that it has yet to reflect consensus and will not prejudge discussions in Antalya.) The note contains three “buckets” of issues: (i) Implementation of the JTWP, with a placeholder for messages from the sixth dialogue; (ii) Placeholder for the outcome of the review of the JTWP; (iii) Process for the operationalisation of the JTM, with a proposed clustering of indicative and non-exhaustive elements of the JTM.

Since the SB 64 Bonn session, Parties and observers have advanced discussions through formal submissions and an informal unrecorded intersessional workshop on just transition, convened by Australia in Sydney from 30 Sept to 2 Oct 2026.

Negotiations in Antalya are expected to follow similar fault lines, but with heightened intensity, rapidly shifting dynamics and evolving positions among negotiating blocs ahead of Antalya, driven by several key reports that are also scheduled for release ahead of COP 31.

The full synthesis of the mapping exercise report is now scheduled for release. The mapping exercise has been a contentious issue because developed countries had used it to counter developing country proposals for the JTM institutional arrangements, both in Belem and at SB64 (See TWN update). An initial mapping output released in Bonn sparked concerns as developed countries were using it to restrict and stall the JTM by making it a prerequisite for further progress.

Governance arrangements for operationalising the JTM remains a core area of contention, alongside ongoing debates surrounding its institutional relationship with the JTWP.

Developing countries generally advocate for a dedicated constituted body under the JTM. While structural proposals differ, all seek to secure essential means of implementation for just transitions and address international structural barriers for the transitions. In general, there are several different proposals on the table, including placing the JTM under the umbrella of the JTWP, accompanied by an expanded mandate for the JTWP; some have proposed the phasing out of and replacement of the JTWP entirely, once the JTM becomes fully operational. Other ideas point to having parallel tracks, while maintaining the JTWP and JTM as complementary, operating side by side. Each option presents distinct strengths and weaknesses that require careful assessment, alongside its own set of negotiation challenges.

Conversely, most developed countries oppose a new body, citing budget constraints and arguing that the mapping exercise demonstrates abundant ongoing work and existing resources across actors. Consequently, they favour a simplified or scaled-back JTM focused on harmonizing fragmented initiatives, with an emphasis on domestic just transition implementation and creating enabling environments to mobilize private sector finance in support for higher mitigation ambition. How these negotiations unfold will be closely watched.

LOSS AND DAMAGE

In matters related to Loss and Damage, on the agendas of COP and CMA is an item on Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) for Loss and Damage associated with climate change impacts. At CMA.8 Parties are expected to consider matters relating to the governance of the WIM.

COP 19 and 20 requested the WIM Executive Committee to report annually to the COP through the SBs. Article 8.2 of the PA provides that the WIM shall be subject to the authority and guidance of the CMA, which may be enhanced and strengthened as determined by the CMA. At CMA7 Parties noted that considerations on the governance of WIM will continue at CMA.8 as per decisions 22/CMA.7, 23/CMA.7 and 24/CMA.7.

The SBs in Antalya are expected to consider the Joint annual report of the Executive Committee of the WIM and the Santiago network for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage.

Parties are expected under this agenda item to discuss recommendations from both the WIM ExCom and the Santiago Network Advisory Board in relation to the fulfilment of their respective mandates and work plans, including those coming from the outcome of the 3rd WIM Review that concluded at COP30 in Belem last year.

Issues relating to the adequacy and replenishment of financial resources needed for the provision and catalysation of technical assistance and other action and support through the Santiago Network and the WIM ExCom and its expert groups could also come up.

GLOBAL STOCKTAKE (GST)

Parties are also expected to launch the technical phase of the second GST (GST 2) at CMA.8, though this would not involve any negotiations. With the launch of this phase, the process for collection of inputs for GST2 would begin. The SB Chairs have already issued their call for inputs for GST2. Under the adopted modalities for the GST (decision 19/CMA.1), such inputs include various synthesis reports to be provided by the constituted bodies and other inputs from Parties, international organizations, the scientific community, and observer organizations.

Related to this is the selection of the co-facilitators for the tech coal dialogue under the technical assessment phase of GST 2. One co-facilitator will be selected by developing countries through the G77 and China and one by the developed countries. These co-facilitators are tasked with running the technical dialogue, the first of which will take place in Bonn in June 2027 with the second and third in Nov 2027 and June 2028. The technical dialogue is where Parties and other stakeholders will be able to assess and discuss, at a technical expert level, the inputs received during the information collection phase. The co-facilitators will then produce a synthesis report that will serve as input to be considered by Parties, including through high-level events, during the consideration of output phase of GST2 in 2028.

There will likely be no negotiations among Parties with respect to GST2 during CMA 8, although there might be informal discussions among Parties that might take place in relation to the future organization of work of the joint contact group of the SBs under which the consideration of GST2 outputs by Parties will take place.

FINANCE

There are several sub-agenda items on finance that are both in the CMA/COP agendas, including the CFWP. These items include matters relating to the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF), guidance to the Green Climate Fund (GCF), Global Environment Facility (GEF); report of the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD), and guidance to the Fund; Adaptation Fund (AF); and Article 2.1.c of the PA and its complementarity with Article 9 of the PA.

Matters relating to long term finance and the seventh review of the financial mechanism are the items that are only on the COP agenda. At COP26, Parties decided that the item on long term finance would conclude in 2027. COP27 mandated the SCF to prepare a biennial report on progress towards achieving the goal of mobilising jointly $100 billion per year to meet the needs of developing countries. At COP29, the Presidency prepared a summary of the high-level ministerial dialogue convened on this matter. At COP30, consideration of that report was deferred to COP31.

At COP23, it was decided that the seventh review of the Financial Mechanism would be initiated at COP26. Between COP26 to COP30, Parties could not conclude consideration of the guidelines for the review. This item is on the agenda of COP31.

VEREDAS DIALOGUE ON ARTICLE 2.1(C) OF THE PA

The first meeting of the “Veredas Dialogue” on the implementation of Article 2.1(c) of the PA and its complementarity with Article 9 of the PA, was held at SB64. As there is no common understanding on the scope of Article 2.1(c) or the manner of its implementation, discussions under the Veredas Dialogue contentious unless duly guided by the “safeguards” provided for in para 3 of the Belem decision, which was secured collectively by developing countries.

Established by decision 11/CMA.7, developing countries view the safeguards provided in para 3 of the decision as “guardrails” which are foundational for any consideration of the matter, outlining the scope of the safeguards as being “bottom-up, nationally determined; that there is no common interpretation of Article 2.1(c); [that the dialogue should be] non-prescriptive, non-punitive, facilitative exchange of views; respectful of national sovereignty, including fiscal and monetary sovereignty, will not place additional burden; is consistent with the principles and provisions of the PA – with CBDR&RC [common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities] as a key element, equity, country-driven and owned, sustainable development and poverty eradication”. Their concerns and challenges stemmed from the push by developed countries for top-down, “prescriptive”, “common” or “global” implementation of Article 2.1(c), thus infringing national sovereignty and undermining different national circumstances of developing countries.

Per the co-chairs’ workplan for the dialogue, they made available an informal summary of the first meeting of the Veredas dialogue. Para 13 of Decision 11/CMA.7 provided for the ‘Xingu Finance talks’ to be convened by the Presidency, “as an annual high-level round table with a view to facilitating a cooperative exchange of views among all interested Parties and non-Party stakeholders.” In 2026, the Xingu Finance talks were held on October 13 in Bangkok alongside the 2026 annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The topics discussed at the talks were: (i) Expanding fiscal space for climate investment and (ii) Reducing the cost of capital through risk sharing and guarantees.

As per the mandate of the Veredas dialogue, its co-chairs are expected to prepare an annual summary report on the deliberations of the Veredas Dialogue and the Xingu Talks, for consideration by Parties at CMA.8.

ADAPTATION FUND (AF)

There are three matters under consideration: arrangements of the AF to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement (PA); membership of the AF Board and the fifth review of the AF.  At SBI 64, Parties agreed to continue consideration of the three matters at SBI 65 on the basis of the draft texts.

Ensuring the AF’s smooth transition to exclusively serve the PA is seen as an urgent priority by developing countries under the G77 and China. This time sensitive matter has been in a deadlock since SB 62 (June 2025) on a largely procedural issue. Developing countries have maintained that the matter should not be held hostage by developed countries by linking it to the issue of membership of the AF Board, which is a separate matter under consideration with political implications.

The key contentious issue is whether there should be three separate decisions or a single decision on the three matters under consideration. Developing countries prefer the former, while developed countries prefer the latter.

Developing countries view the institutional arrangements (new trustee arrangements; memorandum of understanding regarding secretariat services; governance-related decisions) necessary for the smooth transition of the AF to exclusively serve the PA, as a matter of urgent priority, with a stand-alone separate decision, and likewise on the other two matters. On the other hand, developed countries have linked the institutional arrangements to the membership of the AF Board, as a “package”.

The AF Board membership matter is politically controversial as it relates to the change in “terminology” from “Annex 1/non-Annex 1” (referring to developed and developing countries respectively under the Convention) to “developed” and “developing” countries [as referred to, generically in the PA. It is to be noted that any change in the composition and numbers of the Board in the garb of change in terminology is seen as “non-negotiable” by developing countries as the current composition of AF board provides them larger representation, which is unlike any other multilateral climate funds.

At the closing plenary of SB64, G77 and China stated that for developing countries consensus had been achieved amongst Parties on matters relating to the arrangements of the AF to exclusively serve the PA and fifth review of the AF. Developed countries on the other hand said their understanding is that the draft texts do not prejudge the issue of whether there would be one decision or three separate decisions. (See related TWN update). It can be expected that discussions on AF at SBI 65 will remain contentious.

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER

Sub-items related to technology are in the provisional agendas of both COP and CMA. The sub-agenda items that are present in both the COP and CMA’s agenda are: (i) the Joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre (CTC) and Network and (ii) Host of the Climate Technology Centre. The items that are included only in COP’s agenda are (i.) Third review of the effective implementation of the CTCN; and (ii.) Poznan Strategic Programme on technology transfer.

The matter of the host of CTC will be top priority for developing countries at COP31. SBI 64 recommended the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) as the host and agreed to continue consideration of this matter at SBI 65. SBI 64 also requested the secretariat to prepare a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the COP, CMA and UNEP on the basis of elements of an MOU. Discussions at SBI 65 will be on the basis of the draft MOU prepared by the secretariat in this matter.

Decision 18/CMA.7 on the Belém Technology Implementation Programme (BTIP) requested the TEC and CTCN to include information on actions taken by them for implementation of BTIP, among other things.

Parties would be invited to consider the Joint Annual Report. It can be expected that discussions may dwell on the challenges faced by the two bodies in implementing their functions and meeting the needs of developing countries, among other things. Developing countries particularly want to provide guidance to TEC and CTCN for strengthening the further implementation of BTIP, including the mobilisation of additional resources for this purpose.

COP31 is also expected to consider the report on the third independent review of the effective implementation of CTCN. At COP26, Parties had requested the secretariat to commission a report for this purpose for consideration at COP31. It can be expected that Parties will discuss the various bottlenecks faced by the CTCN identified in the review report. Developing countries will emphasize on preserving the country-driven nature of the CTCN and lay stress on the need for developed countries to provide adequate, predictable and sustainable finance to the CTCN.

RESEARCH AND SYSTEMATIC OBSERVATION (RSO)

At SB64, negotiations under RSO focused on the Research Dialogue that was held on June 8. Discussions became highly contentious over whether there is a need for incorporating equity in future climate modelling or not. Developing countries like India, Arab Group, and Kenya were in favour of including equity, while developed countries like the EU and UK were opposed to it. (See related TWN update.)

At SB 65, negotiations under RSO will focus on how findings from the dialogue at the Earth Information Day (EID) are reflected in the decision text. According to its information note, EID 2026 will focus on the following themes: (a) State of the global climate observing system; (b) Earth observations in support of effective climate action through: (i). Integrated observation systems for assessments, modelling, Early Warning Systems (EWS) and other climate services, (ii) Equitable access to observations data and related technologies. Two guiding questions for the dialogue are: What are we observing; and how can Earth observations inform action and decision-making?

GLOBAL IMPLEMENTATION ACCELERATOR AND BELEM MISSION 1.5

Antalya will see the second session of the Global Implementation Accelerator (GIA), a Presidency initiative launched via para 41 of the Mutirao Decision at COP30. Being organised as a mandated event, the GIA is “a cooperative, facilitative and voluntary initiative…to accelerate implementation across all actors to keep 1.5 °C within reach and supporting countries in implementing their NDCs and NAPs.”

According to the UNFCCC COP31 schedule, an information session on the GIA will be held on Nov 9 and a high-level event to exchange experiences and views on matters related to the GIA will be held on Nov 13. Following these sessions, the Presidencies will present a summary report to CMA.8. Work under the GIA is happening under the guidance of Presidencies of COP30 (Brazil) and COP31 (Turkiye and Australia). Per an information note on the GIA shared earlier this year, the three Presidencies plan to jointly develop “the Accelerator as an initiative to help climate solutions move faster from ambition and commitment to real-world implementation. The Accelerator will focus on identifying specific solutions arising from the Global Climate Action Agenda.”

The ‘Belém Mission to 1.5’ was launched by the COP30 Mutirao decision’s para 42. This Mission is “aimed at enabling ambition and implementation of NDCs and NAPs, to reflect on accelerating implementation, international cooperation and investment in NDCs and NAPs across mitigation and adaptation.”  At CMA8, it will conclude following the presentation of a summary report by the three Presidencies.

FOSSIL FUELS AND DEFORESTATION ROADMAPS

On the sidelines of SB 64, two COP 30 Presidency-led events were held on the ‘roadmap on transitioning away from fossil fuels’ and on the ‘roadmap on addressing deforestation’. These roadmaps are not on the negotiating agendas of the SBs or the COP/CMA, as there was no consensus in Belem to discuss them because they were not a part of the negotiation agenda at COP30. However, the Brazilian COP-30 Presidency at the closing plenary in Belem did indicate that it will convene high-level dialogues on these topics. The COP 30 Presidency convened a press conference on Nov. 3 on these initiatives.

ACTION AGENDA – ELECTRIFICATION TARGET AND COVER DECISION

The COP31 Turkiye Presidency announced a set of global targets as part of the Global Climate Action Agenda, which is being led by it. At the beginning of the SB64, the Turkiye Presidency proposed an electrification target to raise share of final energy demand met by electricity from just over 20% today to 35% by 2035.

It can be expected that this target could become contentious if some Parties advance their inclusion into the official negotiated outcomes under COP/CMA. This is because the Action Agenda is not a part of the formal negotiation processes.

There have however been indications by the COP 31 Presidencies that they intend to have a ‘cover decision’ that can include the electrification target, among other matters.

The matter of the ‘cover decision’ can be expected to be contentious, both in terms of process and substance, as to how it is generated. – Third World Network